science was one indispensable component of a new synthesis. As Merton described it, this ethos is that affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on the man of science. The norms are expressed in the form of prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, and permissions. They are legitimatized in terms of institutional values. These imperatives, transmitted by precept and example, and reinforced by sanctions are in varying degrees internalized by the scientist, thus fashioning his scientific conscience or, if one prefers, his 'superego '. (1973b [1942] : 268-9)
That complex of values is comprised of universalism, communalism, disinterestedness and organized skepticism.
The second component was a sound sociological analysis of the role-set (not just the 'role') of the scientist.
As Merton put it, individuals in society are not, by virtue of occupying a single status, called upon to enact a single role, but to participate in a role-set. That is, ' We must note that a particular social status involves, not a single associated role, but an array of associated roles.' (Huff, 2003 (Huff, [1993 : 17, citing Merton, 1968b: 423) As I rephrased it,
The role-set of the scientist is most typically comprised of a college or university professor, a teacher of students, a member of a disciplinary department, a researcher, a writer and author, and, quite possibly, a gatekeeper who referees knowledge claims produced by other scientists. Nor should we ignore the role of the scientist as expositor to the public of authoritative knowledge, above all, when these knowledge claims are published. In that form they purport to carry the imprimatur of the scientific community at large to which the scientist belongs. (Huff, 2003 (Huff, [1993 : 18; cf. Merton, 1973c: 520-1) For a variety of reasons, it is not realistic to think that all of these components of the scientist's role-set could come into being at the same time. That means that we have to approach the emerging role-set in historical terms. I cannot say just when all of these theoretical components jellied in Merton's thinking, but clearly not all at the same time. Merton articulated the ethos of science in 1938 and more completely in 1942, while his article on 'The Role-Set' first appeared in the 1957 edition of his Social Theory and Social Structure. Perhaps the first articulation of this larger conceptual picture is in the Preface to the paperback JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 7(2) edition of Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England that was issued in 1970. There Merton wrote:
. . . the socially patterned interests, motivations and behavior established in one institutional sphere -say, that of religion or economy -are interdependent with the socially patterned interests, motivations, and behavior obtaining in other institutional spheres -say, that of science. There are various kinds of such interdependence, but we need touch upon only one of these [for example, between religion and science]. . . . The same individuals have multiple social statuses and roles: scientific and religious and economic and political. This fundamental linkage in social structure in itself makes for some interplay between otherwise distinct institutional spheres even when they are segregated into seemingly autonomous departments of life. Beyond that, the social, intellectual and value consequences of what is done in one institutional domain ramify into other institutions. . . . Separate institutional spheres are only partially autonomous, not completely so. (Merton, 1970 : ix-x)
Thus the intersecting demands of associated and complementary roles play a commanding part in everyday experience. In this Preface Merton does not explicitly bring in the ethos of science, probably because he was addressing the cultural and historical context of 17th-century England, and, when he wrote his dissertation in 1936, he had not yet worked out his prescient notion of the ethos of science. Indeed, I am not aware of any discussion in Merton's writings where the role-set of the scientist is conjoined with the ethos of science. Given this background, I want to explore what Merton referred to as 'the larger problem' of the comparative and historical development of science, and in particular to look at some historical roots of the ethos of science.
The Comparative Framework
If we look at the rise of modern science from a comparative and historical point of view, the cultural and institutional foundations of science take on greater significance. For example, if we consider the three major locations of significant scientific activity historically -China, the Islamic world of the Middle East, and Western Europe 1 -it becomes evident that only in Western Europe were academic intellectuals able to institutionalize the continuous and long-term pursuit of modern science. Consequently it is important to locate our point of departure in the transformations of the 'early modern' era, when we may find some of the roots of the ethos of science. Of course the young Robert Merton was a sociologist steeped in history, but this analysis will suggest that when Merton turned toward the social psychological side of the life of science, he opted not to draw upon historical materials that would have supported his analysis.
The young Robert Merton was very much interested in this intersection of cultural imperatives and modes of behavior. Indeed, this is the central thrust of all of Merton's thinking, that is, the intersection between social structure and human behavior. In his seminal piece on 'Social Structure and Anomie' (Merton, 1968a ), Merton carefully argued that cultural values, not biological instincts, often motivate people to pursue deviant patterns of behavior. For example, the cultural value of monetary success may drive individuals to cut corners, to chose deviant or illegitimate means to achieve the goal of monetary success.
On the other hand, one could say that Merton's classic study of science, technology and society in 17th-century England looked at the impact of changing cultural values, namely the impact of the rising Puritanism of the 17th century on scientific and technological activity. But in his larger work, Merton preferred to frame the problem as one of 'social structure' impinging upon and shaping social behavior. This is the framework noted above of his other great classic essay, 'Social Structure and Anomie' (Merton, 1968a ). This became the standard 'functional' approach of Mertonian, and large parts of American, sociology. But this shift in emphasis meant that no more questions were to be asked about the cultural history that generated the ethos of science itself. This would leave the question unanswered as to whether or not the ethos of science was peculiar to science itself, or whether it is a more generally shared ethos of Western intellectual life.
Autonomy or Cultural Embeddedness?
When the ethos of science was debated in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of commentators asked whether or not the Mertonian 'norms of science' are specific to science, or whether 'the norms which Merton suggested are peculiar to science may well be characteristic of the Western . . . academy in general' (Mulkay, 1969: 27) . Mulkay went on to say that if these norms applied throughout the Western academic community, 'then we would not be able to explain the uniquely rapid and continuous growth of the natural sciences' in terms of the norms. But Merton's own explicit view was that, '[s]eparate institutional spheres are only partially autonomous, not completely so' (Merton, 1970 : ix-x), and that 'the institution of science is part of a larger social structure', within which 'it is not always integrated' (Merton, 1973b (Merton, [1942 : 271). In other words, the norms of science are a subset of the broader cultural norms and cannot be expected to emerge independent of that larger cultural universe.
If we follow this Mertonian lead, then the test of the existence and effects of the norms of science is to be found in comparative, historical and, perhaps, civilizational analysis. Such an analysis might find that Mertonian norms were institutionalized in at least one case, but not in others. Such a comparative and historical approach may serve to reveal the very historical embeddedness, or what some might call the cultural 'encoding', of those normative presuppositions in non-scientific, or quasi-scientific, locations.
Natural Philosophy in Islam, China and the West
Of the three locations in the late medieval period, say 1200-1375, we must conclude that overall Arab-Muslim culture had the most advanced scientific thinking, especially in astronomy, mathematics, optics and medicine, though the balance was rapidly shifting in favor of Western Europeans. This was particularly the case in medicine and astronomy, but in other areas as well.
The 13th and 14th centuries in the Muslim Middle East saw the development of non-Ptolemaic models of astronomy, very high levels of mathematical proficiency, and the development of the astronomical models closest to those of Copernicussome would even say that the Islamic models were identical to his, except for their geocentric orientation (Swerdlow and Neugebauer, 1984) . These were the models developed by Ibn al-Shatir, the time-keeper in the Umayyad mosque in Damascus, who died in 1375. China was not a competitor in this field because it lacked geometry, which could be used to develop accurate spherical models of astronomy, and all the leading astronomers assumed that such spherical models would be necessary.
This was also the time of the Muslim physician Ibn al-Nafis (d. 1288), who deduced the lesser, or pulmonary, circulation of the blood from the heart to the lungs and return. It was also the time of Kamal al-din al-Farisi (d. 1320), who, virtually simultaneously with Theodoric of Freiburg, put forth the physical explanation of the rainbow. This could be called the high point in the Middle Eastern development of optics.
The Translation Movement
But with the transmission of the classic works of Aristotle to Europe, along with both original Middle Eastern contributions and commentaries on the Greek classics, which had begun in the 11th century, Europe was poised for a radical transformation in the 12th and 13th centuries (see D'Alverny, 1982; Lindberg, 1978) .
Throughout the 20th century medieval and early modern scholars (e.g. Chenu, 1968; Grant, 1984 Grant, , 1996 Haskins, 1924 Haskins, , 1957 Thorndike, 1923-4; Weisheipl, 1984) pointed out that a new interest in natural science emerged in the 12th and 13th centuries. As a result, a new corpus of scientific work became the central core of study in the European universities. Thereafter -indeed, all the way into the early 17th century -these Aristotelian works On the Heavens, on Meteorology, on Plants and Animals, on Generation and Corruption, and many others, together with new scientific textbooks, gave the European universities a central core of scientific knowledge that served for generations. We could even say that this corpus provided a core of naturalistic puzzles for the European academic community. In that sense it created a disinterested agenda for scientific research and study (to which I shall return).
In this way the long period of Western intellectual gestation, from roughly the 6th to the 11th century was succeeded by a radical change in the 12th and 13th centuries. The result of this transformation was the institutionalization of an important new research agenda, but also the implanting of deep notions about the uses of reason and argument in European intellectual life. The separate domains of theology, law, medicine and, of course, natural philosophy all became deeply infused with the new modes of rational proof and argument that were found in the 'new Aristotle' of the translation movement (cf. Chenu, 1968; Grant, 1996; Lawn, 1993; and North, 1992) .
Reason and Critical Discourse
By the 12th century, scholars in many parts of Europe were arguing that the use of reason and logic were the primary tools of rational and educated individuals. Their image of these instruments of argumentation originated with the Greeks, especially Aristotle, as it had been filtered through incomplete translations as well as expositions of successive scholars who tried to reclaim the Aristotelian modes of demonstrative logic. Examples of this new assimilation of reasoned discourse can be found in the writings of dozens of European intellectuals during the 12th and 13th centuries. We shall now look at some of these.
Logic as understood by Hugh of St Victor (d. 1141) had evolved last in the intellectual history of humankind, 'but is first in order, which ought to be read first by those beginning the study of philosophy, for it teaches the nature of words and concepts, without both of which no treatise of philosophy can be rationally explained' (as cited in Grant, 2001: 48) . But already in the early 11th century, Gerbert of Aurillac (c. 946-1003), who became Pope Sylvester II, had argued that logic was the first of intellectual tools that had to be mastered by Christian scholars.
By the end of the 12th century the uses of logic had been institutionalized, not only in the universities broadly, but in each of the major domains of intellectual discourse, that is, in theology, law, medicine, ethics and, of course, natural philosophy. People like Berengar of Tours (c. 1000-88), St Anslem of Canterbury (1033-1109) and Peter Abelard (d. 1142) all insisted on the primacy of the use of reason and logic in theological discourse. Berengar even argues that reason should be applied to matters of faith, that is, theology, because the powers of reason and argument are the gift of God (Grant, 2001: 51) . Of course, this claim could be found in Plato's Timaeus, where he asserts that philosophy is the gift 'than which no greater boon has ever come or shall come to mortal man as a gift from heaven' (Plato, 1959: 47b) . 2 Furthermore, Berengar claimed 'that it is incomparably superior to act by reason in the apprehension of truth; because this is evident, no one will deny it except a person blinded by madness' (as cited in Grant, 2001: 52) . Such sentiments led many intellectual elites, especially the theological elite, to think that the ability to use reason and logic as shown by Aristotle and his commentators was indeed a gift from God. This is an entirely different conception than exists in Islamic thought. According to Islamic teachings, God and humankind share no qualities. Islamic creeds all say that God has 'no partners' and it is a dangerous form of blasphemy (shirk) to 'associate' anything or anyone with God (see Watt, 1994) .
It was Peter Lombard (c. 1095-160) in his famous Sentences, or collection of 'opinions' of religious scholars, who created systematic theology, and whose book became a standard text for centuries. The idea was to take all the doctrines of faith that had emerged in the course of Christian history, and systematically organize them as best the human mind could using the principles of logical argument. This would turn 'faith' itself as a theological subject into a 'science' (Chenu, 1968; Huff, 2003 Huff, [1993 : 141).
The belief that reason and logic should be applied to the Holy Scriptures was urged by a variety of great 12th-and 13th-century thinkers, including Abelard, Berengar and St Anselm. Here is St Anselm of Canterbury (1033-109) arguing that his students demanded that he write a meditation based solely on reason 'in order that nothing in Scripture should be urged on the authority of Scripture itself, but that whatever the conclusion of independent investigation should declare to be true' ought to be stated in a plain and 'unadorned style' (cited in Grant, 2001: 54) . Furthermore, there were those ecclesiastics who placed their faith in laws of nature and hence criticized those who attempted to find miracles where reasoned inquiry would suffice. Sometimes this was inspired by Aristotle's works, but at other times it was inspired by Plato's writings. Here is William of Conches (d. 1154) in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus arguing for the orderliness of the universe and its determination by physical causes:
And the divine page says, 'He divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament.' Since such a statement as this is contrary to reason let us show how it cannot be thus.
(cited in Stiefel, 1976: 7) Conches put it even more boldly when he affirmed that 'it is not the task of the Bible to teach us the nature of things; this belongs to philosophy' (as cited in Chenu, 1968: 12) . This strongly parallels Galileo's statement (borrowed from a contemporary cleric) in the 17th century: '. . . the intention of the Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes to heaven, not how heaven goes' (Galileo in Finocchiaro, 1989: 96) . In short, there was both an intellectual revolution in the modes of thought employed by the European medievals and an institutional transformation that brought the rich legacy of the Greeks, above all that of Aristotle's natural philosophy, into the universities. The European university curriculum centered on the trivium (grammar, rhetoric and logic) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) came increasingly to accentuate and require the study of logic and the 'exact sciences' along with the natural books of Aristotle (cf. Grant, 1996: 86-205; Leff, 1992; North, 1992; Weisheipl, 1984) . More specifically the Aristotelian thrust came to be called the study of the 'three philosophies', that is, moral philosophy, metaphysics and natural philosophy. These included (as noted above) Aristotle's works on physics, metaphysics, plants and animals, as well as the heavens and meteorology, that is, the study of the space between earth and heaven. Before I suggest the connection between the ethos of science and this revolutionary new approach to natural science and learning, it is important to grasp the contrast with the Middle Eastern context.
The Islamic Middle East
In this context it was the Islamic colleges, or madrasas, that were the dominant institution for intellectual training. But they were not able to institutionalize this naturalistic agenda because these institutions were devoted to the Islamic sciences, that is, study of the Qur'an, the hadith collections (sayings of the prophet Muhammad), Arabic history and grammar, and, above all, Islamic law (Huff, 2003 (Huff, [1993 : Ch. 5). There were scholars with high levels of mathematical proficiency who taught in the madrasas, but the natural sciences (biology, optics, physics, meteorology, etc.) were not taught in them. 3 Instead they had to be taught privately, generally outside the Islamic colleges in the privacy of the homes of scholars. Likewise, medicine was not taught in the madrasas, and sometimes was explicitly excluded from study in them. In a word, the Middle Eastern institutions of higher learning, the madrasas, did not undergo a radical transformation when the Arab world encountered the rich heritage of Greece. Instead, the madrasas were created as a bulwark against the incursions of Greek philosophy (the 'foreign sciences') into Islamic thought. Consequently, they remained faithful to their charters as 'pious endowments' (waqfs) committed to the preservation of the letter and spirit of Islamic religious life. Those legal and theological prescriptions prevented until the 20th century the indigenous creation of European-style universities with an emphasis on the natural sciences (see Huff, 2003 Huff, [1993 : 362-73). In a word, the agenda based on the pursuit of the natural sciences was not institutionalized in the Islamic schools.
China
In China, similar to the Middle East, the study of the natural sciences took place privately and outside the structure of the official examination system, which was based on the neo-Confucian interpretation of the ancient classics of morality, history, poetry and statecraft. There was no scientific core of naturalistic studies such as astronomy, physics, optics or medicine (and mathematics only occasionally) within the examination system. Or to put it more positively, it was only during brief periods of time that mathematical and astronomical problems were included in the examination venue (Elman, 1994) . One should say, however, that the Chinese did have a special inclination to study the mathematical parts of music, which resulted in their discovery of equal temperament in music (see Isacoff, 2001: 166-70) .
It should also be noted that Aristotelian demonstrative logic was unknown to China until the time of Matteo Ricci in the early 1600s, when he introduced Euclidean geometry with its special kind of mathematical proof (Engelfriet, 1998) . This effort to introduce the formal aspects of inductive and deductive reasoning was still being carried on by Europeans in the 19th century when they saw their work as a continuation of the early 17th-century effort of Ricci (Elman, 2005: 331) .
It was the mandarin officials, the bureaucrats, who established the content of the exams, who monitored them, and who corrected the students' triennial examination papers. Consequently an autonomous class of philosophers, independent of the bureaucracy, was unable to emerge. Like the Middle Eastern situation, there was surprisingly advanced scientific thinking ongoing in private spheres outside the examination system (see Elvin, 2004) . In general, however, this protoscientific realm of inquiry could not escape the control of the Chinese bureaucracy, and that prevented the creation of any autonomous spheres of intellectual or scientific inquiry.
The most poignant example of this bureaucratic control is seen in the field of medicine and post-mortem examinations. Instead of entrusting physicians with the task of examining bodies in which foul play was suspected, the district magistrate was sent to the scene with a little autopsy booklet. But the actual examining of the body was done by an uneducated person who had learned his anatomical skills privately, and who called out his findings to the magistrate, who recorded them on a standard form that was used from the 13th century all the way to the early 19th century (Huff, 2003 (Huff, [1993 .
Not even physicians could emerge as a class of specialists capable of performing what we would expect of them without the supervision of a district magistrate. Likewise, the same overarching control of China's intellectual elite prevented the emergence of an autonomous class of legal specialists, that is, lawyers, until the 20th century. In the 17th and 18th centuries the great struggles of the Jesuits to introduce modern science and astronomy into China failed, despite two centuries of effort (see Elman, 2005 ; also see Huff, 2003 Huff, [1993 : Chs 6-7).
The Legal and Institutional Revolution
Given this outline of the contrasting institutional arrangements of the three civilizations, it is evident that Western Europe was unique in granting institutional autonomy to natural philosophers, legal scholars and physicians. That was due to the revolutionary social movement centered in the legal revolution of the 12th and 13th centuries in Europe that created a progressive new set of legal and institutional possibilities. It resulted in a generalized recognition of social and communal differences that recognized in the law 'the right' of groups to form their own legally distinct communities and associations: for example, cities and towns, charitable organizations, guilds of merchants as well as doctors and surgeons, and, of course, universities (Berman, 1983; Huff, 2003 Huff, [1993 ; Michaud-Quantin, 1970) .
That meant that they were legal entities with their own jurisdiction, their right to create new rules and regulations, to buy and sell property, to sue and be sued, to have representation before the King's court, and to follow the democratic principle that 'what affects all should be considered and decided by all' (Berman, 1983; Post, 1964) . This new conception of a zone of legally autonomous entities also laid the foundations for parliamentary democracy (Strayer, 1970) .
Embedding Elements of the Ethos
Secondly, focusing again on the implications for universities and the new scientific agenda, the faculty within these newly recognized (and legally autonomous) universities decided that they and their students should study the so-called 'new Aristotle' along with commentaries, and other textbooks derived from Arab and Greek sources. This new curriculum placed a high premium on naturalistic studies, that is, the study of natural science. As I put it elsewhere:
The European medievals created autonomous, self-governing institutions of higher learning centered on the study of the natural books of Aristotle. This curriculum and course of study created an agenda that was no longer a private, personal, or idiosyncratic preoccupation. It was a disinterested agenda of naturalistic inquiry that had been institutionalized. (Huff, 2003 (Huff, [1993 : 235, see also 189)
In doing so, it served a dual function in that it created a disinterested agenda for research and study, and it institutionalized cultural norms stressing disinterestedness and organized skepticism. It was disinterested in the sense that it was institutionalized within the universities; it did not represent any particular private interest. Secondly, it was based on a shared heritage going back through the Muslims to the Greeks. It that sense it was non-denominational and non-political, or, alternatively, we can say it was transnational and trans-ethnic. The leading thinkers knew that Greeks, Arabs, Muslims, Jews and others had studied these naturalistic questions; and while there were those who wanted to proclaim the superiority of Christianity, they knew at the same time that they were dealing with questions (and answers to those questions) that had a universal application. They were neither exclusively Christian nor European. This was clearly the case in optics and astronomy, and assumed to be so in medicine. Furthermore, the very 'instrument' of argumentation, that is, Aristotle's Organon, was perceived to be a universal arbiter of truth and veracity. It had come from the Greeks, but it had also been mastered and used for a time by Arabic-speaking and other Middle Eastern peoples. This format of argumentation served as a set of rules by which philosophical, scientific and other questions were to be settled. Hence they constituted a set of universalistic criteria (in the Mertonian sense) for intellectual dispute resolution, as can be seen by the following.
The Logic of Disputed Questions
These elements of probing inquiry can be viewed as organized skepticism, and they were built into the very reception and transformation of Aristotle's logic. This resulted in the development in the 12th century and thereafter of scholastic 'quaestio disputata' literature (see, e.g., Chenu, 1968: 291-300; Lawn, 1993; Spade, 2002) . This was a form of argument and disputation that required the scholar to raise a question, and then to advance arguments both for and against the proposition. This was a more advanced form of the 'Yes and No' (Sic et Non) format proposed earlier by Peter Abelard. After considering the opposing arguments, the author (or lecturer in the classroom) had to state his own position.
It is significant that this form of inquiry uses the third person, as in, 'let us inquire whether . . .': for example, 'let us inquire whether the world is round . . . whether the earth moves . . . whether it is possible that other worlds exist . . . whether the existence of a vacuum is possible', and so on. The questions of this agenda (i.e. as applied to natural philosophy) included such issues as the functioning and transformations of the natural world; the question of whether the world is singular or plural; whether the earth turns on its axis or is stationary; 'whether every effecting thing is the cause of that which it is effecting'; whether things can happen by chance; whether luminous celestial bodies are hot; whether the sea has tides; and so on for virtually every known field of inquiry (see the texts in Grant, 1974: 199-210; summary in Huff, 2003 summary in Huff, [1993 : 237). The very form of the exercise has built into it a disinterestedness that relies on the instruments of logic to reach a demonstrable result. It is the academic 'we' that is asserting an apparent truth, not just the declaration of an individual disputer. Perhaps in that sense we can see intimations of an intellectual communalism as well as universalism shared by all the participants in these discussions.
Sources of Skepticism in Dialectics
However, neither Aristotle nor the European medievals were fooled by the seeming force of such logic. Aristotle had written a whole work on 'sophistic fallacies', a guide to propositions that have a surface appearance of plausibility, but which could be shown to be false. This subject of possible fallacies resulted in the development of a large literature called 'Sophismata'. It was a significant body of writings by masters of logic and demonstrative reason that worked over all sorts of plausible and implausible questions such as the ones outlined above (see Lawn, 1993; Spade, 2002: 57ff . for other applications). The thrust of the literature was to raise a question, state arguments for and against it, state one's own view, and then deal with opposing possibilities. As Spade puts it, . . . the beauty of this form is that it forces you to deal explicitly with objections to your own views. Either you will have to take account of objections in actual circulation, in the sense of a live 'issue of the day', or else you will at least have to anticipate objections, in the case of other questions.
( 2002: 58) From a sociological point of view, this looks like a form of organized skepticism built into the very framework of discussion. This same method of raising questions, both pro and con, was used in theology where Thomas Aquinas asks 'whether God exists' or 'whether God does not exist' and uses the disputation format to deal with the questions raised (Spade, 2002: 57f.) . In addition to the formal structure of these logical arguments, leading intellectuals raised other cautions about their sheer fecundity. For example, John of Salisbury (c. 1115-80) , one of the leaders in the application of the dialectic method to physical questions, signaled the need for a certain amount of skepticism regarding its use. It was clear to him that logic and dialectic were indispensable for arriving at the truth, but unwise use of dialectic could result in confusion and harm. Dialectic is indeed useful, he avers in Policraticus, . . . it is of great benefit to one who has a good knowledge, but it is of little use to one who is ill informed [just as a sword in the hands of a weak soldier is useless], so dialectic, if it lacks the help of other disciplines, is in a way defective and useless.
(as cited in Lawn, 1993: 21) He goes on to say that there are many physical things about which a wise man may retain doubts: things concerning the causes of things and their binding together and aversions, about the flux and reflux of the ocean, the source of the Nile, the increase and decrease of the humors in animals according to the motion of the Moon, and about various hidden secrets of nature, etc.
(cited in Lawn, 1993: 23) But apart from these skeptical doubts we know that the humanist reaction of the 15th and later centuries raised many more doubts about the uses of Aristotelian logic in the universities and elsewhere.
Humanism and Philosophical Skepticism
This development is far too complex to fully outline here within the limits of this forum (see, among others, Grafton and Jardine, 1986; Kristeller, 1979; Rüegg, 1992) . Let it simply be said the intellectuals of the 12th, 13th and 14th centuries fashioned new modes of inquiry, based on Aristotle's logic, and these impersonal modes of inquiry proved widely useful for scholars in many disciplines, including law, theology and the natural sciences. They had built into them a profound organized skepticism and a disinterestedness that transcended individual idiosyncrasy. Nevertheless, at a certain point even greater skepticism emerged, during the rise of the new humanism. When this movement was coupled with a rigorous philosophical skepticism (see Popkin, 1979) it gave rise to a prolonged period of doubt and deep introspection. This included discussions about the appropriate instruments of argument and inquiry, whether sense perception was at all reliable, as well as the appropriate curricula for the universities and academies. It lasted from the late medieval period all the way into the 17th century and the time of the scientific revolution. But the message is clear: the academic history of the West is one of continual doubt and skepticism at the same time that enormous energy was devoted to the study of naturalistic questions about the behavior of the physical world.
It is not a stretch to see in that prolonged debate, going back to the 12th and 13th centuries, sources of the elements of disinterestedness, of organized skepticism and communalism that we associate with the Mertonian ethos. The naturalistic agenda of seeking to understand the causes of the panoply of natural phenomena -in physics, astronomy, biology, optics, medicine, and so on -had been adopted from Aristotle's 'natural books' and had been put at the center of university education in Western Europe.
Although a reaction set in against the excesses of the development of Aristotelian logic, Aristotelian modes of inquiry persisted into the 17th century, guiding many forms of naturalistic inquiry. As one scholar put it, even the use of the quaestio disputata, as a method, 'probably [in] the older universities, . . . was still being used in the mid-seventeenth century for teaching a very broad spectrum of knowledge, based it is true, on a foundation of Aristotelianism, but incorporating much early and late scholastic philosophy' (Lawn, 1993: 143) . This suggests 'that there was no sudden break in teaching methods' (Lawn, 1993: 143) , but that only gradually did the use of new experimental techniques and forms of reasoning replace the older forms. This is the opinion reached earlier by the pioneering work of Charles Schmitt (1981a Schmitt ( , 1981b Schmitt ( , 1983 . . . that the study of Aristotle during the Renaissance was not merely a blind continuation of the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages . . . that, contrary to general opinion [of the 1970s] there was a very great diversity of attitudes, methods, and dependence on the corpus Aristotelicum among the Aristotelians themselves during the Renaissance. (Schmitt, 1983: 7) Viewed in comparative and historical perspective, this is one of the reasons why modern science got such a solid grounding in the West as opposed to other civilizations.
Merton's Ethos in Historical Context
Our inquiry here concerns Robert Merton's prescient articulation of 'the ethos of science'. It took place in two phases. In his first paper on this topic, 'Science and the Social Order', Merton refers to 'intellectual honesty, integrity, organized skepticism, disinterestedness, and impersonality' (1973a [1938] : 259). In the second paper four years later, 'The Normative Structure of Science' (this is retitled from 'Science and Technology in a Democratic Order'), he identified the now familiar universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism (Merton, 1973b (Merton, [1942 : 277ff.). In that paper he subsumed 'impersonality' under the heading of 'universalism', with its stress on objectivity and the salience of pre-established rules of scientific evaluation. 'Intellectual honesty' and 'integrity' become subsumed values, while the other two norms, 'organized skepticism' and 'disinterestedness', reappear virtually unchanged. My concern here is not with these changes and Merton's attempt to refine his analysis, but with the possible historical sources that may have inspired his uncommon leap of the sociological imagination. It is a truism that the original reasons for putting forth a scientific idea need not be the final justification of the idea. There might be other, and perhaps, stronger evidence for a particular theory than the evidence at hand in the first instance, what some might call the context of discovery.
In this case, Merton was a sociologist steeped in history who published his landmark doctoral thesis, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, in 1938, yet there is only one reference to any of his historical materials in the two papers on the ethos of science. Given the fact that Merton's thesis was published in Orisis in 1938, the same year as his first publication on the ethos of science, one would have expected that he would have cited numerous passagesof 'precepts and examples' -from the voluminous records and diaries of the scientists who founded and contributed to the Royal Society. The one example he does cite falls under 'communism' (later changed to 'communalism'). This concerns the quest for priority of discovery and 'property rights'. Newton is cited to the effect 'that [natural] philosophy is such an impertinently litigious Lady, that a man had as good be engaged in lawsuits, as have to do with her' (Merton, 1973b (Merton, [1942 : 273 n. 11). From another perspective within the ethos of science, this might appear to be organized skepticism.
If we look at the context of Merton's thesis about the rise of the scientific movement in England in the 17th century, we see that he contrasted the marked rise in the 17th-century interest in 'modern' empirical science with the medieval situation (Merton, 1970 : 73-6). That is, from his point of view, there was something new and different propelling a rise in scientific interests. This is wholly consistent with Merton's underlying thesis and his identification of the 'Puritan spur' to utilitarian, experimental science.
If we look a little further, it turns out that, despite Merton's amazingly broad reading in the history of science, his notes and discussion do not include
